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I. Introduction
On September 11, 2001, nineteen Muslims from Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates hijacked several commercial
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airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
2,996 people were killed.1 Less than a week later, President George W.
Bush visited the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C. Bush came to the
Islamic Center to meet with Muslim-American leaders and provide an
important message to the American people. “Acts of violence against
innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith,” Bush
explained. “[I]t’s important for my fellow Americans to understand
that . . . . The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That’s not what
Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace.
They represent evil and war.”2
Despite President Bush’s message that day, as the facts of 9/11
materialized and the “War on Terror” began, the American public’s perception of Islam took an unfortunate shape. Over the next decade, the terms
“jihad,” “al-Qaeda,” and “radical Islam” entered the American vernacular.
In addition, horrific stories of radical Islamic religious practices such as
“honor-killings” and the “stoning” of Muslim women were broadcast over
American television. Unsurprisingly, the American public began to question who this new enemy was. Were we simply at war with al-Qaeda? Or
was there a fundamental conflict between Islam and the American way of
life?
Over the past year, a movement that classifies Islam, or more specifically, “Shari’a,”3 as a threat to the United States has offered hyperbolic
answers to these questions.4 More and more, various anti-Muslim groups
1. See THE 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S. chap. 7, 215−53 (2004) available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911
Report.pdf. An additional plane, United Airlines Flight 93, was also hijacked by four alQaeda terrorists (detailing the assembly and training of the terrorists involved in the attack).
During the hijacking, some of the passengers attempted to regain control of the plane. The
plane ultimately crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania killing all 40 people
aboard plus the hijackers. Id. at 10−14.
2. See President George W. Bush, Address at the Islamic Center of Washington
(Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/terrorism/july-dec01
/bush_speech_ 9-17.html. (responding to the American animosity towards Islamic-American
citizens following the September 11 attacks).
3. See Asifa Quraishi, Who Says Shari’a Demands the Stoning of Women? A
Description of Islamic Law and Constitutionalism, 1 BERK. J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN &
ISLAMIC L.J. 163 (2008) (explaining the concept of shari’a and its interaction with American
constitutionalism). Shari’a literally means “way” or “street;” in essence, it refers to the
divine way that God expects Muslims to live. In other words, Sharia is simply a way of life
that Muslims believe has been mandated by God through the Quran and the Prophet
Muhammad’s example. Id. at 164.
4. See generally Wajahat Ali et al., FEAR, INC.: THE ROOTS OF THE ISLAMOPHOBIA
NETWORK IN AMERICA, Center for American Progress (August 2011) available at
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have begun to identify Sharia as a “legal-political-military” doctrine that
seeks to infiltrate the American judicial system and impose a radical brand
of Sharia law in the United States.5 Sadly, while this view has a minute
relation to reality, the rhetoric and fear are gaining attention among national
politicians and in state legislatures across the country. To date, twenty-five
state legislatures have debated or are currently considering bills that would
forbid state judges from considering Sharia law in their decisions.6 While
the legislators in each state are unique, the legislation and the arguments all
share a common theme: a belief that Muslim-Americans are a “monolithic”
and subversive threat to the United States and its way of life. Muslims, the
argument goes, have a singular loyalty to their religion—a religion that
preaches intolerance and violence and advances the notion that the aim of
all Muslims is to build a global “caliphate” that subjects all persons to Islam
and Islamic law.
As this note hopes to illustrate, though such arguments could be
viewed as mere political embellishments, at times of national crisis similar
claims have been successfully advanced towards minority groups in the
United States. In World War II, with the support of the American public,
the Roosevelt administration pointed to military necessity and a subversive
Japanese threat as cause for interning over one hundred thousand JapaneseAmericans in camps along the West Coast.7 Similarly, just over a decade
later, the Truman Administration and the U.S. Congress swept the nation
into a fury over the threat of a Communist Party takeover.8 At that time,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf.
5. See THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, SHARIA: THE THREAT TO AMERICA 11, 6
(2010), available at http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/documents/Shariah_The_Threat
_to_America_(Team_B_II_Report)_9-14-10.pdf. [hereinafter CENTER FOR SECURITY
POLICY] (stating that the United States faces an “insidious ideological threat: the totalitarian
socio-political doctrine that Islam calls shariah”).
6. See Ashby Jones & Joe Palazzolo, States Target Foreign Law, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Feb. 7, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204662204577
199372686077412.html (“Twenty-one states are considering measures that would prohibit
judges from applying the laws or legal codes of other nations in a wide variety of cases.
Three states—Tennessee, Louisiana and Arizona—recently added versions of such laws to
the books, while a fourth—Oklahoma—worked a similar change into its constitution in
2010.”).
7. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (“We cannot say that the warmaking branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour
such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a
menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate
measures be taken to guard against it.”) (quoting Hirabayahshi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 99
(1943)).
8. See ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
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government leaders and the American public were convinced that American
“Communist party members were . . . part of a secret conspiracy, fanatics
who would automatically do whatever Stalin told them to do.”9 In each of
these episodes, the American government took unprecedented steps to
challenge a perceived threat to the American way of life, and in each case
the Supreme Court upheld the government’s actions.10
Today, the same arguments that led to the Japanese-American internments and the Red Scare are being directed towards the Muslim-American
community. Citing disloyalty, a disparate set of values, and a monolithic
community of saboteurs, anti-Muslim activists and organizations are advocating for radical, yet not unprecedented, measures to isolate Muslims
and halt “stealth jihad.”11 This Note will seek to compare the arguments
being advanced by anti-Muslim activists today with the anti-Japanese and
anti-Communist arguments of the past. Part II will briefly explore what
Sharia is and is not and, in so doing, seek to explain the “threat” that antiMuslim groups and politicians have identified. Parts III and IV will then
illustrate the rise of the anti-Sharia movement in the United States and the
legislation that has appeared in states like Virginia, Pennsylvania,
Oklahoma and Tennessee. Next, Parts V and VI will respectively introduce
how similar arguments and legislative initiatives were directed towards
Japanese-Americans during World War II and American Communists and
liberals during the Cold War. Part VII will then look at how the Supreme
Court addressed and upheld the decisions that were made during World
War II and the Cold War and, additionally, offer a brief discussion of where
current jurisprudence lies. Finally, this Note will seek to dispel the belief
that Sharia poses a threat to the American judicial system and argue that as
a policy going forward, Muslim-American integration should be decoupled
DOCUMENTS 21 (Lynn Hunt et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2002) (“The sense of urgency that surrounded
the issue of communism came from the U.S. government’s attempt to mobilize public
opinion for the cold war . . . . Above all, it legitimated the McCarthy era repression by
dehumanizing American Communists and transforming them into ideological outlaws . . . .”).
9. Id.
10. See Jones & Palazzolo, supra note 6 (outlining the recent trend to demand keeping
foreign laws out of consideration in American courts); Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(convicting petitioners of violating the Smith Act, which outlaws conspiracy to overthrow
the government).
11. See CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 5 at 8 (“Those who today support
shariah and the establishment of a global Islamic state (caliphate) are perforce supporting
objectives that are incompatible with the U.S. Constitution, the civil rights the Constitution
guarantees and the representative, accountable government it authorizes.”).
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from the “security” umbrella and, instead, become rooted in a social and
civil rights endeavor that recognizes Muslim-Americans essential
“American-ness” and desire for acceptance.
II. Sharia Law: Myths and Realities
Over the past decade, there has rightfully been an unremitting devotion
by scholars to explain Sharia law and the Islamic faith.12 Most of these
works provide excellent descriptions and insights into how Sharia is
practiced in the U.S. and abroad. Still, the sheer number of books and
articles on Sharia and Islam is perhaps indicative of the subject’s complexity. While the following description will come short of providing a full
representation of Islam, for our purposes it should provide an adequate
illustration of Islam’s core teachings and values.
At the foundation of Islam are five pillars: belief in God,13 ritual
prayers,14 fasting,15 the hajj (i.e. pilgrimage),16 and charity.17 Sharia is
18
essentially concerned with the observance and practice of these pillars.
From the most literal of standpoints, Sharia is defined as “the path or the
way.”19 Similarly, in the religious context, it is said to be “the way God is
20
asking people to behave and to live.”
Though it is often described to the contrary, Sharia is not a clear and
articulate body of law. More precisely, “[it] is a path to
religion . . . primarily concerned with a set of values that are essential to
Islam and the best manner of their protection.”21 There are generally
thought to be two tangible sources for Sharia: the Qu’ran, which Islam
teaches to be the word of God, and the sunna, a biography of the Prophet

12. For example, a WestLaw search of law review or journal articles with “Sharia” or
“Shariah” in the title yields a result of over 2,100 articles written within the past ten years.
13. MOHAMMED HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (2008).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Surat Al-Mā’idah 5:48: (“To each among you have We prescribed a law and an
open way.”) (translating from Arabic).
20. See Quraishi, supra note 3, at 164 (explaining how Sharia law and the Islamic
religion developed).
21. See KAMALI, supra note 13, at 2. (giving general information about Sharia law).
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Mohammed.22 Out of the sunna comes the “hadith”—teachings that
provide more “concrete details . . . [of] what the Prophet has done or said,
23
Naturally, while the Qur’an and sunna
or even tacitly approved . . . .”
cover many subjects, these sources do not provide answers to all of life’s
questions. In turn, when faced with questions that the Qur’an or sunna do
not clearly answer, Muslims turn to religious scholars and leaders to
interpret the texts and provide a conclusion. This interpretive work—
“ijtihad”—is, in fact, quite similar to the work that lawyers and judges do.
In essence, these religious “jurists” are being asked to answer specific legal
questions—as they relate to one person’s situation—based upon the
interpretation of existing rules.
It is through the differing and occasional inexplicable interpretations
of the Qu’ran and sunna that controversy often arises. In certain Islamic
societies and nations across the world, Muslim leaders have used the guise
of the Qu’ran to promote abhorrent laws and policies. As many scholars
have noted, however, many of these shocking interpretations have little, if
any, basis in the Qu’ran.24 As the Islamic scholar Wael Hallaq has explained, in its original form Sharia was not meant to apply equally to all
people. On the contrary, Sharia recognized that “individuals were
not . . . indistinguishable members of a generic species, standing in perfect
parity before a blind lady of justice. Each individual and circumstance was
deemed unique, requiring ijtihad that was context-specific.”25 Following
the end of colonialism, however, Islamic political leaders in the Middle
East and Africa soon began to use the language of the Qu’ran and sunna to
promote political objectives.26 Sadly, this politicization has transformed
Sharia “from a worldly institution and culture to a textuality, namely, a
body of texts that is entirely stripped of its social and sociological
context . . . .”27 Though scholars note that the “study of Sharia should not
be approached in the expectation of finding a comprehensive or systematic
22. See id. (detailing where Sharia law is drawn from).
23. WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 16 (2009).
24. See CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 5, at 6. (stating that even though the
Center for Security Policy, an anti-Sharia group, ignores this idea in making their final
argument, the group initially concedes that among most of the world’s Muslim, Sharia is just
“a reference point for a Muslim’s personal conduct, not a corpus to be imposed on the life of
a pluralistic society”).
25. See HALLAQ, supra note 23, at 166.
26. See id. at 167−68. (discussing changes and transformational forces such as
centralization, codification, homogenization, and militarization were all in fact “props of the
modern state project” that led to a view of Sharia that was detached from its past).
27. Id. at 167.
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code or codes that present definitive answers to precise legal issues of the
day,”28 many Islamic states and political leaders have attempted to do just
that. In the process, “the very meaning of Islamic law [has been] severely
curtailed, if not transformed, having been emptied of the content and
expertise necessary for genuine evaluation of Shari’a-on-the-ground, and of
29
its operation within an ‘ecological’ system of checks and balances.”
The Sharia that has arisen in certain Islamic states has paved the way
for draconian laws and policies that offend Western notions of equality and
pluralism. Moreover, it has led to the conspiracy theorists and anti-Muslim
notions that this strict, yet false, form of Sharia will be brought to the
United States and forced upon Americans. Undoubtedly, world events and
public statements from radical Muslim groups such as the Taliban in
Afghanistan, Hamas, and al-Qaeda have fueled the notion that Islam is an
incompatible and violent religion. Nevertheless, polling appears to suggest
that over the past decade, this fear of Islam has spread and increasingly
Americans are looking towards their Muslim-American neighbors as
outsiders who share different values and hold seditious goals.
III. The War on Terror and the Rise of the Anti-Sharia Movement
In the wake of 9/11, the pattern of terrorism and the military threat to
the United States seemed too obvious for many Americans to ignore. After
all, on 9/11 nineteen Muslims attacked the United States and within a short
time, the U.S. was in conflicts in Muslim nations against an enemy that
pointed to Islamic teachings as their justification for war.30 Yet over time,
as the day-to-day scenes from the warfronts in Iraq and Afghanistan faded
from the headlines, what was once an outward fear of terrorism began to
shift inward towards domestic Muslim-American communities. Increasingly, Americans began to wonder if, in addition to an external security
threat, Islamic and Muslim-Americans posed a danger from within.31
28. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, Shari’a in the Secular State: A Paradox of Separation and Conflation, in THE LAW APPLIED: CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC SHARI’A 321,
321 (Peri Bearman et al. eds., 2008).
29. HALLAQ, supra note 23, at 168.
30. See THE 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 215−53 (explaining the 9/11
attacks and subsequent actions by the United States).
31. See PUBLIC RELIGION RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Majority Say Congressional Hearings
on Alleged Extremism in American Muslim Community ‘Good Idea’ (2011) available at http:
//publicreligion.org/research/2011/02/majority-say-congressional-hearings-on-alleged-ext
remism-in-american-muslim-community-%E2%80%98good-idea%E2%80%99/ (“A plural
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Today, this fear has reached a tipping point. Opinions of Islam within
the U.S. are now at their lowest point ever.32 The Pew Research Center
reports that the percentage of Americans with favorable views of Islam has
33
dropped from forty-one percent to thirty percent in the past five years.
Additionally, there is now a growing sense amongst Americans that Islam
has an inherent anti-American message and that Muslims are inherently unAmerican and disloyal. According to a recent report by Ohio State and
Cornell University, only fifty-two percent of Americans believe that
Muslims in the United States are supportive of the United States and only
thirty-three percent believe that Muslims are “trustworthy.”34 Similarly, a
sizeable proportion of Americans now believe that Muslims should be
35
barred from running for President or sitting on the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly, the turn in anti-Muslim attitudes can be traced in large
part to world events and the threat of terrorism. Nevertheless, in the decade
since 9/11, there has been a corresponding rise in anti-Muslim organizations that promote the view that the greatest threat to America comes not
from al-Qaeda or foreign terrorists, but from your Muslim-American
neighbor. The Center for American Progress recently released an extensive
report that explained how organizations such as the American Public Policy
Alliance, Jihad Watch, ACT! for America, and Stop Islamization of
America have garnered over $40 million in donations over the past ten
years and have helped spread the notion of “an Islamic conspiracy to
destroy ‘American values.’”36
ity (46%) of Americans believe that American Muslims have not done enough to oppose
extremism in their communities.”).
32. See THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, RELIGIOUS PERCEPTIONS IN AMERICA (2010),
available at http://www.abudhabigallupcenter.com/143762/Religious-Perceptions-America.
aspx (“Fifty-three percent of Americans say their opinion of Islam is either ‘not too
favorable’ (22%) or ‘not favorable at all’ (31%)”.).
33. See OMAR SACIRBEY, Muslims In America Divided On Improving Image 10 Years
After 9/11, HUFFINGTON POST, July 24, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08
/24/muslim-america_n_935685.html (stating that despite learning more about the Muslim
faith, Americans seem to be turning against it more strongly).
34. See CORNELL UNIVERSITY SURVEY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE “BIN LADEN”
EFFECT: HOW AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT MUSLIM-AMERICANS SHIFTED IN THE WAKE
OF OSAMA BIN LADEN’S DEATH 3 (2011), available at http://www.sri.cornell.edu/sri/files
/binladen_report.pdf (describing the anti-Muslim sentiment amongst a large number of
Americans).
35. See Alex Altman, Time Poll: Majority Oppose Mosque, Many Distrust Muslims,
TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 19, 2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8
599,2011799,00.html (quantifying the animosity towards the Muslim-American community).
36. See Ali et al., supra note 4, at 2 (describing several organizations that are
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At the forefront of this campaign has been the Center for Security
Policy. Its report, “Shariah: The Threat to America,” has become the cornerstone publication for the anti-Sharia movement. In it, the authors conclude that “America is engaged in existential conflict with foes that have
succeeded brilliantly in concealing their true identity and very dangerous
capabilities.”37 These enemies, the report adds, “adhere to an all-encompassing Islamic political-military-legal doctrine known as shariah. It obliges
them to engage in jihad to achieve the triumph of Islam worldwide through
the establishment of a global Islamic state . . . .”38
The report calls on Americans to resist the urge to welcome Muslims
into their communities as the United States has done in the past with other
minority groups or “Noble Savages.” For the authors,
There is a crucial difference in the contemporary incarnation of this
‘Noble Savage Other,’ however: Where the Other of yesteryear used to
live vividly imagined, if dimly understood, in the Western imagination,
the contemporary Other now lives, quite literally, in the West itself.
Indeed, a massive demographic shift has brought adherents to shariah—
a doctrine that, by definition, opposes all others—deep into the nonIslamic world. The Other is still vividly imagined, if dimly understood.
But where he once provided intellectuals with a theoretical foil against
modernity, the Other—in this century, in the collective form of prac39
titioners of shariah—now manifests itself as a concrete bloc.

The segment of American society that the Center for Security Policy
and anti-Sharia activists identify as being particularly vulnerable to the
“Muslim threat” is the American judicial system. According to this
argument, “based on shariah’s tenets, its core attributes . . . and its bid for
supremacy over all other legal or political system, there can be no
confusion on this score: . . . shariah is an enemy of the United States
Constitution. The two are incompatible.”40 Americans, in turn, must
awaken to the reality that “the United States has been infiltrated and deeply
influenced by an enemy within that is openly determined to replace the U.S.
Constitution with shariah.”41

dedicated to the undermining of Muslim-Americans).
37. CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 5, at 11.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 127.
40. Id. at 123.
41. Id. at 13.

192

19 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 183 (2012)

An example that has frequently been underlined as an illustration of
this growing danger is a New Jersey criminal court case from late 2009.42
The case gained national attention after the trial court judge acquitted the
defendant, a Muslim man who had admitted to beating and raping his
wife.43 The husband claimed that under Islamic law, he was allowed to
44
have sex with his wife whenever he demanded. Accepting this defense,
the trial court judge found that that the husband's religious belief necessarily eliminated his “intent.”45 While this bizarre and egregious ruling was
46
immediately overturned by an appeals court, anti-Sharia critics pounced
on the trial court’s decision as an example of Muslims attempting to usurp
the American judicial system and impose Sharia law on American
society.47
Similar arguments have now taken hold among national political
leaders. Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives
and Republican presidential candidate, recently warned that “Sharia is a
mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and in the
world as we know it.”48 According to Gingrich, “Sharia in its natural form
49
has principles and punishments totally abhorrent to the Western world.”
Similar arguments have come from conservative leaders such as former
42. See S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 422 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2010) (holding that
“[d]efendant’s conduct in engaging in nonconsensual sexual intercourse was unquestionably
knowing, regardless of his view that his religion permitted him to act as he did”).
43. See id. at 421 (“The trial judge found as a fact that defendant committed conduct
that constituted a sexual assault and criminal sexual contact, but that defendant did not have
the requisite criminal intent in doing so.”). See also Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988 (Md.
App. 1996) (interpreting American law by affirming the use of Pakistani law).
44. See id. at 416 (“Plaintiff testified that defendant always told her: ‘this is according
to our religion. You are my wife, I c[an] do anything to you. The woman, she should submit
and do anything I ask her to do.’”).
45. See id. at 418 (“After acknowledging that this was a case in which religious
custom clashed with the law, and that under the law, plaintiff had a right to refuse
defendant’s advances, the judge found that defendant did not act with a criminal intent when
he repeatedly insisted upon intercourse, despite plaintiff’s contrary wishes.”).
46. See id. at 421 (“The trial judge found as a fact that defendant committed conduct
that constituted a sexual assault and criminal sexual contact, but that defendant did not have
the requisite criminal intent in doing so. His conclusion in this respect cannot be
sustained.”).
47. See CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 5, at 18 (emphasizing that while the
case was overturned, “the fact that such a reversal was necessary is frighteningly
instructive”).
48. Newt Gingrich, Address at the Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Research
Symposium: Am. at Risk: Camus, Nat’l Sec. and Afghanistan (July 29, 2010).
49. Id.
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Senator Rick Santorum, Rep. Michelle Bachmann (R-MN), Rep. Peter King
(R-NY) and Herman Cain.50 All have stressed a common message: Islam
and Sharia are adverse to American values and Muslims are a subversive
threat to the United States.
IV. The Anti-Sharia Movement within State Legislatures
With public opinion of Islam now at historic lows, it is perhaps unsurprising that politicians have begun to promote legislation that exploits
these views. The breadth and spread of the anti-Sharia movement has been
extraordinary. Today, twenty-five state legislatures have proposed and
debated legislation that would forbid judges, state officials, or in some
cases even citizens from observing Sharia.51 Predictably, the drive behind
the legislation is rooted in the same anti-Sharia organizations and activists
noted above. Leading the way is the American Public Policy Alliance
(“APPA”) and its model legislation entitled American Law for American
Courts (“ALAC”). The APPA warns,
“One of the greatest threats to American values and liberties today
comes from abroad, including foreign laws and foreign legal doctrines
which have been infiltrating our court system at the municipal, state and
federal levels . . . . Examples include “conflict-of-law” issues with
foreign law, including many countries that have Shariah-centric legal
systems . . . . APPA focuses on countering this infiltration of anti52
Constitutional laws across a broad variety of initiatives.

Versions of the ALAC model are now being promulgated and debated
in legislatures throughout the country. Though there have been variations in
language and strategies, the core principles of the legislation are identical.
The ALAC model provides that “it shall be the public policy of this state to
protect its citizens from the application of foreign laws when the
50. See Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Sharia Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July
30, 2001, at A1 (stating that Michele Bachmann has “signed a pledge to reject Islamic law,
likening it to ‘totalitarian control’”).
51. See, e.g., H.B. 88, 27th Leg. (Ark. 2011) (making inapplicable choice of law
provisions applying foreign law unless consistent with U.S. and Arkansas Constitutions);
S.B. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011) (same); H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Az. 2011) (prohibiting any controlling use of foreign law); H.R.J. Res. 1004, 2011 Leg.
Assemb., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011) (proposing Constitutional amendment prohibiting use of
international law).
52. American Public Policy Alliance, About Us, http://publicpolicyalliance.org/
?page_id=2 (last visited March 2, 2012).
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application of a foreign law will result in the violation of a right guaranteed
by the constitution of this state or of the United States . . . .”53 The act
further provides that a “foreign law, legal code, or system means any law,
legal code, or system of a jurisdiction outside of any state or territory of the
United States.”54 Finally, the ALAC model states that “a contract . . . shall
be void and unenforceable if the jurisdiction chosen includes any law, legal
code or system . . . that would not grant the parties the same fundamental
liberties, rights, and privileges granted under the U.S. and [State] Con55
Similar versions of the ALAC model act are now being
stitutions.”
debated in over twenty-three states.56 Though the language of the ALAC
model act appears innocuous and unremarkable, the outspoken state legislators that sponsor the bills have been clear in their motivations.
The most notorious of proposals have surfaced in Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. In Oklahoma, the legislation process involved an unusual player—the citizenry. There, State Representative
Rex Duncan was the lead sponsor and chief author of the “Save Our State
Amendment.”57 The legislation called for an amendment to the state’s
constitution to prohibit the state courts from following the legal precepts of
other nations and, specifically, provided that “the courts shall not consider
international law or Sharia Law.”58 Representative Duncan had compared
Sharia law to a “cancer” and stated that his proposed bill “will constitute a
59
pre-emptive strike against Sharia law coming to Oklahoma . . . .” “While
Oklahoma is still able to defend itself against this sort of hideous invasion,”
60
Duncan warned, “we should do so.” After passing the State Senate and
53. American Public Policy Alliance, American Laws for American Court Model Act,
available at http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=170 (last visited March 2, 2012).
54. Id. at § 1.
55. Id. at § 4(a).
56. See Ashby Jones & Joe Palazzolo, States Target Foreign Law, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Feb. 7, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020466220457
7199372686077412.html (“Twenty-one states are considering measures that would prohibit
judges from applying the laws or legal codes of other nations in a wide variety of cases.”).
57. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Judge Blocks Oklahoma’s Ban on Using Shariah Law
in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A22 (describing preliminary injunction preventing
the amendment from taking effect).
58. H.R.J. 1056, 52 Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2010).
59. Mark Schlachtenhaufen, Sharia Law, Courts Likely on 2010 Ballot, THE EDMUND
SUN, June 4, 2010, available at http://www.edmondsun.com/local/x1996914371/Sharia-lawcourts-likely-on-2010-ballot.
60. Ed Barnes, Oklahoma’s Ban on Sharia Law Blocked: Supporters Blame State
Attorney General, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/08/
oklahomas-ban-shariah-law-blocked-critics-say-attorney-general-failed-respond/.
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House with overwhelming support, the Secretary of State and Election
Board presented the amendment to the public for a vote of approval.61 The
proposed amendment passed with seventy percent of the public
62
approving.
Immediately after the vote, Muneer Awad, the Executive Director of
63
Mr.
the Oklahoma Council for American-Islamic Relations, filed suit.
Awad, a Muslim who “adheres to the religious principles from the Koran
and the teachings of Mohammed,”64 alleged that the “Save Our State
Amendment” violated his rights under both the Establishment Clause and
65
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. More specifically, Awad
objected “to the . . . singling out [of] his religion for negative treatment.”66
He argued that the amendment would “stigmatiz[e] him and others who
practice the Muslim faith” and would inhibit the practice of Islam by
“disabling a court from probating his last will and testament (which
67
contains references to Sharia law) . . . . ”
After a federal district court granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining Oklahoma from certifying the election results,68 the case moved to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit reached
a similar conclusion yet did not move past Awad’s Establishment Clause
claim.69 The court determined that Mr. Awad had suffered “a form of
‘personal and unwelcome’ conduct with an amendment to the Oklahoma
70
Constitution that would target his religion for disfavored treatment.”

61. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Once certified by the
Attorney General, the Secretary of State transmits the proposed measure and ballot title to
the Election Board.”).
62. See James C. McKinley, Jr., supra note 57, at A22 (discussing popular support for
the amendment).
63. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1118 (alleging that Oklahoma’s “Save our State”
amendment violates the first amendment’s free exercise and establishment clauses).
64. Id. at 1119.
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
66. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1119.
67. Id.
68. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla.2010) (finding that
“plaintiff has made a strong showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of
his claim asserting a violation of the Free Exercise Clause”).
69. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1119 (“Because Mr. Awad’s Establishment Clause claim
provides sufficient grounds to uphold the preliminary injunction, we affirm without reaching
Mr. Awad’s Free Exercise claim.”).
70. Id. at 1122.
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Because of the singular targeting of Islam, the court applied the Larson71
test. Larson provides that if a law discriminates among religions, it will
survive only if the law is “closely fitted to the furtherance of any compelling interest asserted.”72
Oklahoma was unable to provide such a compelling interest. The
government had argued that “Oklahoma . . . has a compelling interest in
determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts.”73 But the court
rejected this argument and responded that while this concern was “valid,”
this “general statement alone [was] not sufficient to establish a compelling
interest for the purposes of this case.”74 The government, the court
explained, failed to “identify any actual problem the challenged amendment
75
seeks to solve.” Indeed, at the preliminary injunction hearing, Oklahoma
had failed to present a single example of an Oklahoma court applying
Sharia law or the legal precepts of other nations.76 Finally, after finding no
compelling interest, the court went on to conclude that “[e]ven if the state
could identify and support a reason to single out and restrict Sharia law in
its courts, the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is hardly an
77
exercise of narrow tailoring.”
Oklahoma’s failures before the Tenth Circuit have not deterred other
states from advancing similar versions of the ALAC model act. In the 2011
session of the Tennessee General Assembly, State Senator Bill Ketron
proposed a bill that would seek to limit material support of “homegrown
terrorism.”78 Homegrown terrorism, the legislation explained, “is primarily
the result of a legal-political-military doctrine and system adhered to . . . by
71. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (holding that a rule exempting
only religious institutions that took more than fifty percent of donations from members or
affiliated groups from reporting requirements, violated the Establishment Clause).
72. Id.
73. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (“[D]efendants’ counsel stated that he was not
aware of any Oklahoma court who had used the precepts of other nations or cultures and was
not aware of any situation where Sharia Law has been applied in an Oklahoma court.”); see
also Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 67–68 (stating lack of specific instances of Sharia law
applied in Oklahoma courts), Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 (10th Cir. 2012)
(“Appellants . . . admitted at the preliminary injunction hearing that they did not know of
even a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law.”).
77. Awad, 670 F.3d, at 1131.
78. See S.B. 1028, 107 Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (“The threat from
terrorism has been documented to exist both outside our national borders and within the
homeland.”).
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tens of millions if not hundreds of millions of its followers around the
world. This legal-political-military doctrine and system is known as
sharia . . . .”79 Sharia, according to the bill, “requires all its adherents to
actively and passively support the replacement of America’s constitutional
republic, including the representative government of this state with a
political system based upon sharia.”80 The bill, which was aimed at curbing
material support for terrorism, went on to state that “[a]ny person who
knowingly provides material support or resources to a designated sharia
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall commit a [felony]
offense.”81
After introducing the bill, Senator Ketron faced an immediate reproach
82
from civil rights groups. Accordingly, with the threat of lawsuits on the
horizon, Ketron and his co-sponsors rewrote the bill and eliminated all
references to Islam and Sharia.83 The revised bill, entitled the “Material
Support to Designated Entities Act of 2011,” passed with overwhelming
support, and while there contained no reference to a specific religion in the
final version, the bill’s supporters exclaimed that the legislation remained
aimed at “protecting our citizens from those who would use religious
doctrine as a justification to commit criminal activities or terrorist acts.”84
The statutory errors in the Oklahoma and Tennessee statutes has
undoubtedly been instructive for the Virginia and Pennsylvania legislators
who have also sought to pass anti-Sharia legislation. In Virginia, Delegate
Bob Marshall has introduced legislation that would prohibit judges from
deciding “any issue in a case or action before that court . . . in whole or in
part based on the authority of foreign law except to the extent that the
United States Constitution or Constitution of Virginia or any federal or state
law requires or authorizes the consideration of such foreign law.”85
Likewise, Delegate Rick Morris has introduced a similar yet broader bill
that proclaims it to be:

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Chas Sisk, Ketron, Matheny Rewrite Shariah Bill, THE TENNESSEAN, March
22, 2011, http://blogs.tennessean.com/politics/2011/ketron-matheny-rewrite-shariah-bill/
(describing changes made to the law following criticism).
83. See H.B. 1353, 107 Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (removing specific
references to Islam and sharia law).
84. Sisk, supra note 82.
85. H.B. 825, Gen. Assemb., 2012 Sess. (Va. 2012).
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A violation of the public policy of the Commonwealth for a contract,
arbitration agreement, or other agreement to provide for the choice of a
foreign law to govern the interpretation, enforcement, or resolution of
any claim under the contact, arbitration agreement, or other agreement if
the foreign law chosen, as applied to the contract, arbitration agreement,
or other agreement, would violate a person’s rights guaranteed by the
86
United States Constitution or the Constitution of Virginia.

In Pennsylvania, State Representative RoseMarie Swanger has introduced legislation that orders courts to disregard “a foreign legal code or
system which does not grant the parties . . . the same fundamental liberties,
rights and privileges granted under the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of Pennsylvania.”87 Any contract between parties which
invokes a foreign legal system, the bill states, “violates the public policy of
the Commonwealth and shall be void and unenforceable if the foreign legal
code . . . would not grant the parties the same fundamental liberties, rights
and privileges granted under the United States Constitution and the
Pennsylvania Constitution.”88 Like the legislation in Virginia as well as the
ALAC model act, the bill does not actually mention Sharia or Islam in the
text. Nevertheless, Rep. Swanger has not shied from revealing the motivation behind the legislation. In a letter to her colleagues, Rep. Swanger
warned that “foreign laws and legal doctrines—including and especially
Shariah law—are finding their way into US court cases.”89 Moreover, she
added, “[t]he embrace of foreign legal systems such as Shariah law, which
is inherently hostile to our constitutional liberties is a violation of the
principles on which our nation was founded.”90
Virginia and Pennsylvania are now just two of twenty-one states that
are currently debating legislation that would forbid judges from considering
foreign or Sharia law.91 As of this writing, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Arizona
and Louisiana already have substantially similar laws in effect.92 Though
86. H.B. 631, Gen. Assemb., 2012 Sess. (Va. 2012).
87. H.B. 2029, Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (Pa. 2011).
88. Id.
89. Letter from PA Rep. RoseMarie Swanger to House colleagues of Pennsylvania
General Assembly (June 14, 2011) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. SOC. RTS. & CIVIL JUST.).
90. Id.
91. See Ashby Jones & Joe Palazzolo, supra note 56 (“Twenty-one states are
considering measures that would prohibit judges from applying the laws or legal codes of
other nations in a wide variety of cases.”).
92. Id. (“Three states—Tennessee, Louisiana and Arizona—recently added versions of
such laws to the books, while a fourth—Oklahoma—worked a similar change into its
constitution in 2010.”).
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the ALAC model act and the most recent state legislative examples focus,
at least facially, on “foreign law,” the drive and rhetoric that surrounds
these initiatives is clear. At its core, these bills and the anti-Sharia movement is based upon a belief that America is at risk and that Muslims are the
danger. Islam, the argument goes, demands a foreign and fraudulent set of
beliefs that are irreconcilable with American legal and societal principles.
As Tennessee State Senator Rick Womick recently opined while attending
the Preserving Freedom Conference93 in Madison, Tennessee, “I don’t trust
one Muslim in our military because they’re commanded to lie to
us . . . . And if they truly are a devout Muslim, and follow the Quran and
the Sunnah, then I feel threatened because they’re commanded to kill
94
me.” While such rhetoric may appear hyperbolic or simply the bellowing
of a politician, the scale and breadth of the legislative initiatives indicate
that the anti-Sharia movement is no longer a fringe effort. Moreover, while
claims of Muslim-Americans being fundamentally ill-suited for citizenship
is indeed extreme, such arguments towards minority groups are by no
means unique to our history. Indeed, during World War II and the Cold
War, the American public and the government identified the Japanese,
liberals and members (or suspected members) of the American Communist
Party as disloyal and dangerous threats to the American way of life.
V. Executive Order 9066 and the Anti-Japanese Backlash of World War II
On February 19, 1942, ten weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066.95
The brief order authorized the Secretary of War to:
[D]esignate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such
action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places
and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may
93. The Preserving Freedom Conference was held in Tennessee in November of 2011.
The Conference was sponsored by the Sharia Action Awareness Network. According to the
conference website, “the Sharia Action Awareness Network is a coalition of individuals and
organizations who are engaged in educating the American citizenry about how Sharia Law
stands in opposition to Constitutional Law, and why that poses a threat to our American way
of life.” available at http://preserving-freedom-conference.ettend.com/.
94. Chas Sisk, Rick Womick Says Devout Muslims Should be Removed From Military,
THE TENNESSEAN, Nov. 11, 2011, http://blogs.tennessean.com/politics/2011/rick-womictells-liberal-blog-muslims-should-be-removed-from-military/.
95. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 C.F.R. 1407 (1942) (discussing military procedures
in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor).
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determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with
respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave
shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the
96
appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.

Though the order said nothing of Japan or Japanese-Americans, to
those behind the order’s formulation, its intent was clear. In a broad sense,
the order gave the military “the power to exclude any persons from designnated areas in order to secure national defense objectives against sabotage
and espionage.”97 Specifically, however, “the order was used, as the President, his responsible Cabinet officers and the West Coast Congressional
delegation knew it would be, to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry, both
American citizens and resident aliens, from the West Coast.”98 In the
months that followed, over 100,000 people were forced to leave their
99
Twohomes and businesses and enter military-run internment camps.
100
thirds of the men, women and children were American citizens.
In all,
101
No
the group represented ninety-percent of all Japanese-Americans.
criminal charges were ever brought against the evacuees, nor were they
given an opportunity to protest their displacement.102 They were told to
bring only what they could carry with them and were soon shipped to one
103
Surrounded
of ten permanent internment camps along the West Coast.
by barbed wire and watchtowers, they remained in the camps for three
104
years.
A. Military Necessity: Government Justification for the Camps
As the Executive Order made clear, the impetus for the decision was
“military necessity.”105 In the years and months prior to Pearl Harbor, Nazi
96.
97.

Id.
REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, chap 2 (1982) [hereinafter Personal Justice Denied],
available at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/personal_justice_denied/inde
x.htm.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 114 (1943) (interpreting the
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Germany had successfully invaded much of Europe and, at the time,
American intelligence services presumed that the invasions had been aided
by foreign agents and Nazi sympathizers.106 Predictably, military officials
feared that a similar Japanese invasion of the American West Coast would
be abetted through similar subversive means.107 Some high-ranking military officials presumed such espionage was already underway. Just days
after the attack on Pearl Harbor and without any direct evidence, Secretary
of the Navy Frank Knox noted that “the most effective Fifth Column work
108
Knox was, in effect, placing
of the entire war was done in Hawaii.”
“blame for the Pearl Harbor defeat at the door of the ethnic Japanese in the
United States.”109 As history later proved, not only was Knox’s claim inaccurate, it ignored the fact that many of the Japanese living in Hawaii had
come to the defense and aid of the United States during the Pearl Harbor
attack.110
Knox was by no means alone in his belief that the Japanese posed a
threat. Perhaps the single most important “security” justification for the
decision to remove the ethnic Japanese came from John L. DeWitt, the
Commanding General of the Western Defense Command of the United
States.111 DeWitt was tasked with preparing the American West Coast for a
Japanese invasion, and he was instrumental in formulating and executing
112
In 1942, DeWitt released his Final
the Japanese internment plans.

intentions of Exec. Order No. 9066).
106. Brief for the United States at 16–17, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943) No. 870.
107. Hearing Before H. Naval Affairs Subcomm., 78th Cong. (1943) (testimony of
John. L. DeWitt).
108. See Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97. The “fifth-column” is commonly
defined as a clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a
nation’s solidarity by any means at their disposal.
109. Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97.
110. See BILL HOSOKAWA, NISEI: THE QUIET AMERICANS 463–64 (1969) (discussing
the contributions of Japanese-Americana to the war effort after Pearl Harbor).
111. See Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97, at “Summary” (“The exclusion of the
ethnic Japanese from the West Coast was recommended to the Secretary of War, Henry L.
Stimson, by Lieutenant General John L. DeWit . . . . President Roosevelt relied on Secretary
Stimson’s recommendations in issuing Executive Order 9066.”).
112. See David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: “Liberty Lies
in the Hearts of Men and Women,” 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) (emphasizing that “General
DeWitt’s description and justification of the military aspects of the removal of the Japanese
from the West Coast in 1942, became the linchpin of the government’s argument, repeating
its assertions in the government’s Supreme Court brief”).
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Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942.113 The report
was a collection of military and intelligence reports and theories that had
developed over the past year. In it, DeWitt focused on a confluence of
factors:
[S]ignaling from shore to enemy submarines; arms and contraband
found by the FBI during raids on [Japanese] homes and businesses;
danger to evacuees from vigilantes; concentration of the ethnic Japanese
population around or near militarily sensitive areas; the number of
Japanese ethnic organizations on the coast which might shelter proJapanese attitudes or activities such as Emperor-worshipping
114
Shinto . . . .

From this description, two important factors stood out to DeWitt and
the military leaders: the signaling to Japanese submarines from the coastline and the presence of arms and contraband. An investigation by the FCC
later discovered that DeWitt’s claim of signaling was “so utterly unsubstantiated that, in its brief to the Supreme Court, the Justice Department was
careful not to rely on DeWitt’s Final Report as a factual basis for the
military decision it had to defend. There simply had not been any identifiable shore-to-ship signaling.”115 Likewise, the claim of finding arms
and contraband amongst the Japanese population was misleading, if not
outright false. By May 1942, the FBI had, in fact, seized 2,592 guns,
199,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,652 sticks of dynamite, 1,458 radio
receivers, 2,014 cameras, and numerous other items from Japanese immigrants.116 However, these statistics and DeWitt's report failed to acknowledge that most of these weapons had been confiscated through raids
117
The
on a sporting goods store and a general store owner’s warehouse.
Justice Department later concluded that DeWitt’s claims regarding arms
and contraband were insignificant:
We have not, however, uncovered through these searches any dangerous
persons that we could not otherwise know about. We have not found
among all the sticks of dynamite and gunpowder any evidence that any
of it was to be used in bombs . . . . We have not found a single machine

113. U.S. GOV’T. PRINTING OFFICE, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION
WEST COAST 1942, at vii (1943).
114. Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.

FROM THE
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gun nor have we found any gun in any circumstances indicating that it
118
was to be used in a manner helpful to our enemies.

In sum, even in 1941–42, intelligence and military officials acknowledged that there was no direct evidence of a subversive Japanese threat and
that “no sabotage has taken place to date.”119 Still, the fear of a Japanese
invasion was overwhelming and the military was convinced that every
precaution—even those once thought unimaginable—had to be taken.
B. Disloyal and Subversive: The Public’s Justification for the Camps
Generally, the American public agreed with the military’s sentiment.120 Pearl Harbor and the shocking stories of Japanese brutality
toward American prisoners-of-war sparked intense fear and hatred within
the United States. Many believed the threat of Japanese saboteurs was clear
and tangible. One prominent businessman wrote at the time:
There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will undoubtedly be
some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported
agents or agents already imported . . . . The Japanese, if undisturbed and
disloyal, should be well equipped for obvious physical espionage. A
great part of this work was probably completed and forwarded to Tokio
[sic] years ago, such as soundings and photography of every inch of the
121
Coast . . . .

Such attitudes were common throughout the public. According to
polling conducted by the Office of Facts and Figures in the Office for
Emergency Management, there was a strong consensus that the government
had correctly decided to sequester Japanese immigrants.122 Equally, much
of the population agreed that even Japanese-American citizens posed a
123
threat to the nation and should be removed from the general population.
Interestingly, however, there were important variances in the opinions.
118. Id. See also MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE
JAPANESE EVACUATION 134–36 (1949).
119. U.S. GOV’T. PRINTING OFFICE, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE
WEST COAST 1942, at 34 (1943).
120. See Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97, at chap. 3 (“There was virtual
consensus that the government had done the right thing in moving Japanese aliens away
from the coast; 59 percent of the interviewees also favored moving American citizens of
Japanese ancestry.”).
121. See Personal Justice Denied supra note 97.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Lesser-educated respondents were more likely to consider the Japanese as a
dangerous threat and were advocates for much harsher treatment of the
Japanese.124 In addition, southerners tended to have scathing opinions of
the Japanese, while residents of the East Coast tended to view GermanAmericans as a greater threat.125
The natural response of most Americans following Pearl Harbor and
upon the beginning of the war is perhaps unsurprising. There was also,
however, an organized effort to draw attention to the “Japanese-American
threat” that should draw pause, for it bears a striking resemblance to the
anti-Muslim efforts of today. Members of Congress and Western politicians, for example, were some of the most vocal and aggressive advocates
of the internment camps.126 The California Joint Immigration Committee
sent a lengthy report to California newspapers that supposedly provided
numerous examples of Japanese espionage and treason.127 The report
repeated the fundamental claim that the ethnic Japanese were “totally
unassimilable” and declared that “those born in this country are American
citizens by right of birth, but they are also Japanese citizens, liable . . . to be
called to bear arms for their Emperor, either in front of, or behind, enemy
lines.”128 The report even went so far as to attack Japanese language
schools, which it characterized as “a blind to cover instruction similar to
that received by a young student in Japan—that his is a superior race, the
divinity of the Japanese Emperor, the loyalty that every Japanese, wherever
born, or residing, owes his Emperor and Japan.”129
Nativist and other conservative organizations were also active in
promoting the backlash. The Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden
West viewed the Pearl Harbor attack and war with Japan as a natural
consequence of America’s liberal immigration policy. In its January 1942

124. Id. (“Relatively uneducated respondents were more likely to consider the Japanese
the most dangerous alien group, and they were also disposed to advocate harsher treatment
of the Japanese who were moved away from the coast.”).
125. Id. (“People in the south, in particular, were prone to treat Japanese harshly.”).
126. See Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97, at chap. 3 (“On January 30, [1942,]
House members from the Pacific Coast urged the President to give the War Department
‘immediate and complete control over all alien enemies, as well as United States citizens
holding dual citizenship in any enemy country, with full power and authority to require and
direct . . . evacuation, resettlement or internment.”).
127. See id. (claiming that ethnic Japanese had committed espionage in Hawaii and the
Philippines).
128. Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97, at chap. 2.
129. Id.
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issue of The Grizzly Bear, the organization’s flagship publication, the editor
chided the American people for failing to heed their prior warnings:
Had the warnings been heeded—had the federal and state authorities
been “on the alert” and rigidly enforced the Exclusion Law and the
Alien Land Law; had the Jap propaganda agencies in this country been
silenced; had the legislation been enacted . . . denying citizenship to
offspring of all aliens ineligible to citizenship; had the Japs been
prohibited from colonizing in strategic locations; had not Jap-dollars
been so eagerly sought by White landowners and businessmen; had a
dull ear been turned to the honeyed words of the Japs and the pro-Japs;
had the yellow-Jap and the white-Jap “fifth columnists” been disposed
of within the law; had Japan been denied the privilege of using
California as a breeding ground for dual-citizens (nisei);—the treacherous Japs probably would not have attacked Pearl Harbor December 7,
1941, and this country would not today be at war with Japan.130

Similarly, the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association, long a critic of
Japanese immigrants as a source of cheap-labor along the West Coast,
offered a ringing endorsement of the internment camps and relocation
efforts in a Saturday Evening Post article:
We’re charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons.
We might as well be honest. We do. It’s a question of whether the white
man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown man. They came into this
valley to work, and they stayed to take over . . . . If all the Japs were
removed tomorrow, we’d never miss them in two weeks, because the
white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And
we don’t want them back when the war ends, either.131

Throughout the country, the tension and fear of Japanese saboteurs
was palpable. Nevertheless, the theory behind Executive Order 9066 and
the fear of Japanese espionage were exaggerated if not completely
misguided. Finally, on January 2, 1945, the exclusion order was withdrawn
and Japanese-Americans were allowed to return to their homes and rebuild
their lives.132

130. THE GRIZZLY BEAR (1942), reprinted in MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS
BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION 48 (1949).
131. Frank J. Taylor, The People Nobody Wants, SATURDAY EVENING POST, May 9,
1942, at 66.
132. See Scott Harrison, Executive Order 9066: Japanese American internment in
World War II, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2012), http://framework.latimes.com/2012 /02/19/
executive-order-9066-japanese-american-internment-in-world-war-ii/#/0 (reflecting on the
legacy of the Japanese-American internment camps).
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On February 19, 1976, as part of the Bicentennial Celebration of the
Constitution, President Gerald Ford issued President Proclamation 4417.
The Proclamation declared that in addition to celebrating the nation’s
Constitution and proud history, we must also recognize “our mistakes.”133
As Ford observed, “[w]e now know what we should have known then”—
Executive Order 9066 and the decision to evacuate loyal JapaneseAmericans was “wrong.”134 In 1980, Congress established the Commission
on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians.135 The Commission
was tasked with investigating the motivation and implementation of
Executive Order 9066 and, following a two-year investigation, concluded
that the factors shaping the internment decision were in fact “race prejudice,
war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”136 Finally, in 1988,
Congress passed the Civil Liberties Restoration Act.137 Within the act,
Congress recognized that “a grave injustice was done to both citizens and
permanent residents of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and
internment of civilians during World War II.”138 Moreover, the act offered
reparations to each of the Japanese-Americans who had suffered
discrimination, personal humiliation and loss of liberty and property as a
result of the U.S. government’s actions.139
VI. Domestic Communism and the Red Scare
By the end of World War II, it was clear to many American policymakers that the nation’s next great threat was the Soviet Union and the
spread of Communism. While it is perhaps unclear if Joseph Stalin did in
fact share Adolf Hitler’s goal of global domination,140 by the start of the
Korean War in 1950, American policymakers had all the evidence they
required. Immediately following World War II, crisis beget crisis. The U.S.
and U.S.S.R would disagree over the make-up of the Polish government in
133. Proclamation No. 4417, An American Promise, 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (Feb. 19, 1976).
134. Id.
135. See Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97, at 5, 8.
136. Id.
137. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989a (2000).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See WALTER LAFEBER, AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND THE COLD WAR, 1945–2006 23
(2008) (“In dealing with foreign communist parties, Stalin’s priority was not world
revolution but . . . Russian security and his own personal power.”).
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1945.141 The Soviets would intervene in Turkey, Iran and the Greek Civil
War in 1947.142 Berlin would be divided between East and West in 1948,
143
and in 1949 the Soviets would detonate their first atomic bomb.
Amongst the foreign policy establishment in Washington, it was clear:
Stalin and Communism, like any totalitarian threat, were on a mission of
global conquest, and only the United States stood in their way.144
Within the U.S., a similar fear and accusation would be lodged at the
American Communist Party. As Ellen Schrecker—a historian and expert
on McCarthyism—has written, “Communist party members were believed
to be part of a secret conspiracy, fanatics who would automatically do
whatever Stalin told them to do.”145 In the spring of 1945, the State Department advised President Truman “to treat the American Communist
146
Like those of Japanese ancestry
movement as a potential fifth column.”
along the West Coast, members of the American Communist Party were
presumed to be agents of the KGB and deeply loyal to the Soviet Union. To
be sure, there were several examples of Soviet espionage throughout the
Cold War. Nevertheless, “[s]uch fear at home was hardly warranted.”147 In
fact, much of the espionage actually occurred during World War II. By
1946, fifty thousand, or around half of the membership of the U.S.
Communist Party’s Political Association had left the group.148 Once the
Cold War had begun, “the demonization of American communism and the
federal government’s purge of its left-wing employees made it impossible
for the Soviet Union to recruit any spies from the party’s declining
149
Indeed, as the renowned historian Walter LaFeber noted,
ranks.”
“[i]ronically Americans began their search for communists at the same time
the Communist party had to begin its own search for members.”150
As Schrecker has discovered, “what transformed the Communist threat
into a national obsession was not its plausibility, but the involvement of the
federal government.”151 By the late 1940’s nearly every branch and agency
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id. at chap. 3.
See SCHRECKER, supra note 8, at 20.
See id. at 20−21.
Id.
LAFEBER, supra note 140, at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
See SCHRECKER, supra note 8, at 25.
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of government—from the Post Office to the State Department—was
engulfed in the anti-Communist crusade.152 Each day brought news of a
new executive order, congressional investigation, or criminal prosecution.
The media became a willing and able promoter of the government message
and by the outbreak of the Korean War, the government had “helped
construct the ideological scaffolding for McCarthyism” and sent “a very
strong signal about the alien nature of communism and its dangers.”153
It was the Executive Branch—the Truman administration and its
successors—that did the most to set the tone and cultivate the antiCommunist threat.154 Specifically, Truman implemented 1) an antiCommunist loyalty-security program for government employees in March
1947, and 2) initiated criminal prosecutions against members and suspected
members of the American Communist Party.
A. Executive Order 9835 and the Loyalty-Security Program
While it was Truman who provided the final clearance of the internal
anti-Communist “security” programs, it was J. Edgar Hoover and the F.B.I.
that provided the political and ideological force. On March 26, 1947,
Hoover, a fervent and conservative anti-Communist, forcefully presented
his views of the internal Communist threat in the United States.155
Testifying before Congress (something Hoover rarely agreed to do) at the
House Committee on Un-American Activities, Hoover offered a doctrine
that would delineate “the main battlegrounds of the McCarthy era,” namely,
institutions such as labor unions, the film industry, and the federal
government.156 Hoover declared that the Communist movement in the
United States “stands for the destruction of our American form of
government . . . and it stands for the creation of the ‘Soviet of the United
States’ and ultimate world revolution.”157 “The Communist,” Hoover
added, “once he is fully trained and indoctrinated realizes that he can create
152. See id.
153. See id. (“The media was the government’s partner, largely because it amplified
messages that come from Washington.”).
154. See id. at 27 (“The executive branch did more than provide the psychic setting for
McCarthyism. The specific steps it took to combat the alleged threat of internal communism
were to intensify the national preoccupation with the issue.”).
155. Id. at 126.
156. Id. at 126.
157. Hearing on H.R. 1884 and H.R. 2122 Before the H. Comm. On Un-American
Activities, 80th Cong. 1 (1947) (statement of J. Edgar Hoover).
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his order in the United States only by ‘bloody revolution.’”158 Finally,
Hoover warned, “[t]he Communist Party of the United States is a fifth
column if there ever was one . . . . There is no doubt as to where a real
Communist's loyalty rests. Their allegiance is to Russia, not the United
States . . . .”159
With this testimony, Hoover provided not only a warning about the
threat of Communism within the United States but also a call to action and
a blueprint for purging Communism from American society and its
institutions. It would not be long before the entire U.S. government heeded
his call. On March 21, 1947, President Truman signed Executive Order
9835.160 Though the government had long had a requirement for examining the backgrounds of government employees, E.O. 9835 greatly enlarged
161
Before, only overtly disloyal activities such as sabotage,
the program.
treason, or advocacy for the overthrow of the government constituted
grounds for termination. With Truman’s order, any “sympathetic association” with an organization or movement that had been “designated by the
Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive” became
a violation.162 Predictably, because the order did not define what exactly
“association” entailed, “the criteria were vague and came to be applied to a
wide range of political beliefs and activities.”163 Soon, people who were on
the “wrong” mailing lists, owned the wrong books or had relatives that
164
One man nearly
belonged to politically suspect groups became targets.
lost his job after he subleased his apartment to a person who had
165
Another employee
“associations” with Communist front organizations.
was suspended because he remained in “close and continuing association
with [his] parents,” individuals who were under suspicion because they had
joined a group on the Attorney General’s blacklist to buy cheap insurance
and a burial plot.166
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Exec. Order No. 9835, Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an
Employees’ Loyalty Program in the Exec. Branch of the Gov’t., 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21,
1947).
161. See SCHRECKER, supra note 8, at 44.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 44.
165. ADAM YARMOLINSKY, ED., CASE STUDIES IN PERSONNEL SECURITY 142–47, 152,
158–59, 169–74 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1955).
166. SCHRECKER, supra note 8, at 177.
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By 1951, as the “Red Scare” swept through the nation, the criteria for
dismissal under the loyalty program had changed from “reasonable
grounds” for believing in someone’s disloyalty to the broader language of
“reasonable doubt as to loyalty.”167 In 1953, President Eisenhower revoked
9835 and replaced it with Executive Order 10450.168 Eisenhower feared
that Truman and E.O. 9835 had been too lenient, and through E.O. 10450,
he ordered all federal agencies to determine whether any federal employees
posed a “security risk.”169 Additionally, this Order expanded the definitions and conditions that were used in the evaluations; while E.O. 9835
had focused largely on an employee’s political affiliations and activities,
E.O. 10450 enlarged the scope of investigation to personal behavior and
170
For example, Eisenhower’s Order provided that any “crimcharacter.
inal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct,
habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion”
may constitute a security threat and grounds for dismissal.171 As The
Washington Post reported at the time, Eisenhower’s order had created more
than a loyalty test; it had implemented a “suitability test.”172 As the language of the new order seemed to insinuate, “a person who drinks too
much,” “an incorrigible gossip,” “homosexuals,” or simply “neurotics,”
could now be deemed disloyal and a threat to national security.173
Between 1946 and 1956, around 2,700 federal employees were
174
Many
dismissed from government service for loyalty-security reasons.
others simply resigned out of fear of the loyalty review process and the
175
The loyalty review
humiliation it often brought on oneself and family.
process was a well-known anti-Communist program. Nevertheless, it was
the criminal prosecution of American Communist Party members and
suspected members that captivated the nation and brought the “Red Scare”
and “McCarthyism” into mainstream America.
167. See id. at 45.
168. See id. at 45 (“Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10450, which revised the
program yet again to make it even easier to weed out security risks.”).
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF
GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 123–24 (2004).
173. Id.
174. SCHRECKER, supra note 8, at 45.
175. See id. at 178 (“Many . . . employees faced with a set of interrogatories that would
have forced them to justify their past political behavior to an unsympathetic audience,
probably resigned instead.”).

A MONOLITHIC THREAT

211

B. Dennis and the Prosecution of Suspected Communists
The decision to criminally prosecute members and suspected members
of the American Communist Party “seems to have been made in a rather
haphazard way, the product of bureaucratic routines rather than a high-level
political decision.”176 With pressure mounting from Congress and J. Edgar
Hoover, Attorney General Tom Clark laid the groundwork for the process
177
Because the federal government feared that simply outlawing
in 1948.
the Communist Property would be inconsistent with American ideals and
the Constitution, Clark had Department of Justice attorneys scour statute
books.178 Eventually, the Department settled on the Smith Act of 1940.
Passed just prior to the beginning of World War II, the Smith Act provides
that anyone who:
[K]nowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty,
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the
government of the United States . . . Shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible
for employment by the United States or any department or agency
179
thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.

On July 20, 1948, arrest warrants were issued for twelve national
committee members of the American Communist Party including Eugene
Dennis, the party’s general secretary. As proscribed under the Smith Act,
the members were charged with conspiring to “teach and advocate” the
“violent overthrow” of the American government.180 The transcripts from
the subsequent trials, however, demonstrate that proving this accusation
was extremely difficult and the prosecution was forced to rely on
particularly militant passages from the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin.181
The government’s star witness, Louis Budenz, was the former managing
182
In
editor of the Communist Party’s newspaper, The Daily Worker.
176. Id. at 49.
177. See id. (“Attorney General Tom Clark set the apparatus in motion where delegated
several subordinates to look into the matter early in 1948.”).
178. See id. (“After scouring the statute books in search of an appropriate prosecution
tool, the Justice Department's attorneys settled on a conspiracy charge under the 1940 Smith
Act.”).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940).
180. SCHRECKER, supra note 8, at 51.
181. See id. at 197 (“[T]he government claimed that by subscribing to the doctrines of
Marxism-Leninism [the defendants] were actually calling for the overthrow of the American
government.”).
182. See id. at 50 (“After defecting from the party in the fall of 1945, Budenz came
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testimony, Budenz stated that “socialism can only be attained by the violent
shattering of the capitalist state . . . . In the United States this would mean
that the Communist Party of the United States is basically committed to the
overthrow of the Government . . . as set up by the Constitution . . . .”183 In
addition, Budenz further bolstered the government’s case by declaring the
party’s strict loyalty to the Soviet Union and its quest to infiltrate labor
unions throughout the country.184
From the very beginning, both sides knew that the trials would be as
much of a public awareness campaign as it was a judicial prosecution.
Throughout the trials, the Truman administration went to great lengths to
use the process as a way to shape to the public’s view of domestic
communism.185 The prosecutors “purposely forced several defendants into
contempt of court,” a tactic that “gave prosecutors a pretext for putting
some of the party’s leaders in jail during the trials and thus dramatizing
how dangerous Communists could be.”186 Likewise, due to the clearly
political nature of the trials, “much of the evidence that the government
produced had no relation to the case at hand but was designed to reinforce
the negative image of the defendants . . . .”187 While both sides knew that
the constitutionality of the Smith Act and the prosecutions under it would
have to be settled by the Supreme Court, the government achieved its goal
nonetheless: the trials “transformed party members from political dissidents into criminals—with all the implications that such associations
inspired in a nation of law-abiding citizens.”188
It is difficult to measure the extent to which these government
measures—the loyalty-security program and the criminal prosecution of the
American Communist Party—carried public opinion and built an antiCommunist furor in the U.S. Undoubtedly, however, the American public
was swayed.
under the protection of the Catholic Church, from which he received the financial and
spiritual support he had once gotten from the party.”).
183. Trial Testimony in Joint Appendix, U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950)
reprinted in ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 204 (Lynn Hunt et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2002).
184. See SCHRECKER supra note 8, at 50.
185. Id. at 27 (“By putting Communists on trial, the Truman administration . . . transformed political dissidents into criminals—with all the implications that such associations
inspired in a nation of law-abiding citizens.”).
186. Id. at 51.
187. Id. at 28.
188. Id. at 27.
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VII. The Supreme Court’s Opinion: Korematsu, Dennis and the Necessity
of National Security
The behemoth of “national security” has frequently been touted to
justify the government’s intrusion into the fundamental rights of
Americans; and at times of national crisis, the American public has often
welcomed these actions. Nevertheless, as this note has described, “national
security” has also often been employed to isolate minority groups and stifle
differing points of view. Ellen Schrecker has noted that much of the
rhetoric and action which characterized the Japanese internment decision
and Red Scare can be traced to America’s counter-subversive tradition and
[T]he irrational notion that outsiders (who could be political dissidents,
foreigners, or members of racial or religious minorities) threatened the
nation from within. Projecting their own fears and insecurities onto a
demonized “Other,” many Americans have found convenient scapegoats
189
among the powerless minorities within their midst.

During World War II and in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor,
“[f]ear of possible Japanese sabotage and espionage was rampant, and an
outraged public felt an understandable instinct to lash out at those who had
attacked the country.”190 Still, as Professor Geoffrey Stone recently illustrated, Japanese internment “was also very much an extension of more
than a century of racial prejudice against the ‘yellow peril.’”191 Throughout
1941 and 1942, “[r]acist statements and sentiments permeated the
192
debate . . . about how to deal with individuals of Japanese descent.”
Before the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States,193 the
government justified the internment of the Japanese as a “military
necessity.” The government cited the Final Report of Lt. General John L.
DeWitt and, in its brief, concluded that the Japanese were “a large,
unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by strong
ties of race, culture, custom and religion.”194 Hidden from the Supreme
189. SCHRECKER, supra note 8, at 27.
190. Geoffrey R. Stone, National Security v. Civil Liberties, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2203,
2205 (2007).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2205–06.
193. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 217−19 (1944) (holding that “we are unable to
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those
of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did”).
194. U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE
WEST COAST 1942, at vii (1943).
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Court, however, was the fact that no evidence existed to support the
contention that any persons of Japanese ancestry had been involved in
espionage along the West Coast.195 J. Edgar Hoover himself had concluded
at the time that the call for mass evacuations was based largely on “public
hysteria” rather than fact.196 Only later was it revealed that the “government’s Supreme Court briefs in Korematsu were deliberately sanitized to
keep from the justices any facts contradicting General DeWitt’s fabrications.”197
The Court accepted the government’s word and the necessity of
national security, however, and in a six-to-three decision upheld the
internment decision.198 Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black concluded:
[W]e are not unmindful of the hardships imposed . . . upon a large group
of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is an
aggregation of hardships . . . . To cast this case into outlines of racial
prejudice . . . confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the
[West Coast] because of hostility to . . . his race. He was excluded
because . . . the . . . military authorities . . . decided that the military
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry
be segregated from the [area] . . . . We cannot—by availing ourselves of
the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these
199
actions were unjustified.

Following World War II, it did not take long for many Americans to
realize the egregiousness of the internment decision.200 Nevertheless, as
World War II drew to a close, the nation quickly turned its eyes and fear
towards the Soviet Union and the threat of Communism. Once again, the
government pointed to national security to justify unprecedented intervention. In scenes reminiscent of the fury that gripped the nation in 1941,
195. See Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97 (questioning whether the policy of
Japanese exclusion was militarily justified as a precautionary measure in the absence of
actual sabotage among people of Japanese descent on the West Coast).
196. DON WHITEHEAD, THE FBI STORY: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE 189 (1956) (quoting
memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI, to Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney General).
197. David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: “Liberty Lies in
the Hearts of Men and Women”, 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011).
198. See Personal Justice Denied, supra note 97.
199. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219, 223–24.
200. See MITCHELL T. MAKI, HARRY H. L. KITANO, AND S. MEGAN BERTHOLD,
ACHIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: HOW JAPANESE AMERICANS OBTAINED REDRESS 98
(1999). On July 2, 1948, President Harry Truman signed the Evacuation Claims Act. Though
the act did not address the legality of the internment camps, it did provide compensation for
many of the evacuees who suffered property loss. Id. at 52.
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“the nation demonized members of the Communist Party and . . . [r]edhunters demanded, and got, the blacklisting of thousands of individuals and
a fear of ideological contamination swept the nation.”201
In Dennis v. United States,202 the Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether the U.S. government could criminally prosecute members of the American Communist Party under the Smith Act. In a six-to-two
decision, the Court again sided with the government and concluded that
“the power of the Congress to protect the Government of the United States
from armed rebellion is a proposition which requires little discussion.”203
In the majority and concurring opinions, national security concerns predominated. At the time, the Korean War was raging and, as Justice Vinson
noted, “the context of world crisis after crisis” justified the government’s
prosecutorial powers.204 “The mere fact,” Vinson concluded, “that from the
period 1945 to 1948 the petitioners’ activities did not result in an attempt to
overthrow the Government by force and violence is of course no answer to
the fact that there was a group that was ready to make the attempt.”205
As Korematsu and Dennis illustrate, when faced with questions of
national security and civil liberties, for much of the last century the
dominant approach of the Supreme Court was “to employ the ‘logical’
presumption that military and executive officials making wartime decisions
act fairly and reasonably.”206 In short, “the Court embraced a highly deferential stance, presuming that restrictions of civil liberties in wartime were
constitutionally justified so long as the government could offer a reasonable
explanation for its action.”207
Eventually, the Supreme Court altered its approach. In Yates v. United
States,208 the Supreme Court put an end to the government’s prosecution of
suspected Communists under the Smith Act. Writing for the Court, Justice
Harlan explained that
201. Stone, supra note 192, at 2207.
202. Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951) (holding that “the Smith Act, do[es] not
inherently, or as construed or applied in the instant case, violate the First Amendment and
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, or the First and Fifth Amendments . . . .”).
203. Id. at 501.
204. Id. at 510.
205. Id.
206. Stone, supra note 192, at 2208.
207. Id.
208. Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957) (concluding “that since the Communist
Party came into being in 1945, and the indictment was not returned until 1951, the three-year
statute of limitations had run on the ‘organizing’ charge, and required the withdrawal of that
part of the indictment from the jury’s consideration”).
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[W]hen it comes to Party advocacy or teaching in the sense of a call to
forcible action at some future time we cannot but regard this record as
strikingly deficient. At best this voluminous record shows but a half
dozen or so scattered incidents . . . . We are unable to regard this sporadic showing as sufficient to justify viewing the Communist Party as the
209
nexus between these petitioners and the conspiracy charged.

With the Yates decision and several others decided over the same term,
the Court put an end to the “Red Scare” era of Supreme Court juris210
The argument of national security necessity, however, did not
prudence.
vanish. More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the Bush (and Obama)
administration’s claims of executive authority in the war on terrorism. Thus
far, the Court has refused to grant the degree of deference that led to the
results in Korematsu and Dennis. In Rasul v. Bush,211 the Court held that
federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction to review the legality of the
212
confinement of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
decided on the same day as Rasul in 2004, the Court went even further in its
refusal to grant undue deference to the military and executive officials in
the war on terrorism.
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was seized in Afghanistan by the
Northern Alliance and turned over to the U.S. military.213 After secretly
shipping Hamdi to a naval base in Virginia, the Bush administration
claimed that because Hamdi was an “enemy combatant,” he could be
detained indefinitely, without access to counsel and without any formal
charge or proceeding.214 The Supreme Court disagreed. In an eight-to-one
decision, the Court held that the Bush administration had violated Hamdi’s
215
Writing for the plurality, Justice O’Connor declared
due process rights.
209. Id. at 329−30.
210. The other three decisions were Watkins v. U.S., 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (limiting
HUAC’s investigative activities); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (limiting
state investigative activities); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (limiting loyaltysecurity dismissals).
211. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
212. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that “a citizen-detainee
seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker”).
213. See id. at 510 (discussing, generally the facts surrounding plaintiff’s detainment).
214. See id. at 510–11 (discussing the Government’s justification of plaintiff’s indefinite detainment).
215. Id. at 533 (holding that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification
as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a
fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-
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that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and
a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertion before a
neutral decisionmaker.”216 O’Conner added, it “is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process
is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”217 In
rejecting the government’s contention that the Court should play “a heavily
circumscribed role” in reviewing the actions of the executive in wartime,
O’Connor pointedly observed that “a state of war is not a blank check for
the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”218
While the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have offered hope to those
who fear that another period of hysteria may not lead to another Korematsu
or Dennis, there remain strong reasons to doubt that the Court has moved
completely past the period of granting “logical presumptions” to the
government in the realm of national security.
For one, as a matter of law, Korematsu has never been explicitly
overruled.219 Of course, the fact that Mr. Korematsu’s conviction was
never overturned may no longer be relevant. As Lawrence Tribe has
famously said, it is Justice Jackson’s dissent from Korematsu that has
“carried the day in the court of history.”220 Furthermore, Justice Antonin
Scalia has characterized Korematsu on a par with Dred Scott,221 and in
1988, Congress officially apologized to the Japanese and passed legislation
that allowed those affected by the relocations and detentions to seek
redress.222
maker”).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 532.
218. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
219. See Korematsu v. U.S., 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (overturning Fred
Korematsu’s conviction, only). See also David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of
Korematsu: “Liberty Lies in the Hearts of Men and Women”, 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011)
(noting that the “1984 decision that overturned the conviction was based on a writ of coram
nobis. The writ allows the reviewing court to correct errors of fact, but nothing more”).
220. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 237 n.118 (3d ed.
2000) (noting case law citing this same language).
221. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(believing that the majority’s decision “will be assigned its rightful place in the history of
this Court’s jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott”).
222. See Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts,
50 App. U.S.C. §§ 1989–1989d (2006).
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Still, as has been described, in December 1941, the social, legal,
political and military foundations of the United States were transformed.
The American citizenry, along with the military, became engulfed in a fullscale effort to defeat Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire and virtually
every aspect of daily life became dedicated to the cause. For many modern
legal scholars, such a context and crisis would still provide sufficient
justification for the internment orders. Judge Richard Posner, for example,
of the United State Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit once noted in a
debate that he believed Korematsu was “correctly decided.”223 According
to Posner:
Unquestionably, the order excluding people of Japanese ancestry from
the West Coast was tainted by racial prejudice. On the other hand, many
Japanese Americans had refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the
United States. Good or bad, it was a military order in a frightening war.
Although the majority opinion, written by Justice Hugo Black, is very
224
poor, the decision itself is defensible.

Judge Posner is not alone in his belief that, given the nation’s struggle
in a “frightening war,” Korematsu was the correct decision at the time.
Justice Clarence Thomas, in Grutter v. Bollinger,225 chose to quote the
majority in Korematsu in order to note that “‘[p]ressing public necessity
226
may sometimes justify the existence of [racial discrimination].’”
Thomas added that “[t]he lesson of Korematsu is that national security
constitutes a ‘pressing public necessity,’ though the government’s use of
race to advance that objective must be narrowly tailored.”227
VIII. Avoiding Alienation and Fostering Integration
To date, “public necessity” has not called for the mass evacuation and
internment of Muslim-Americans. Nor have we seen criminal prosecutions
or demands that Muslim-Americans withstand a loyalty-security program to
prove their allegiance. Nonetheless, ‘Islamophobia’ pervades American
society. Notably, the rhetoric that is employed to justify anti-Sharia laws—a
223. Pamela S. Karlan & Richard A. Posner, The Triumph of Expedience: How
America Lost the Election to the Courts, HARPERS MAG., May 2001, at 39.
224. Id.
225. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
226. Id. at 351 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944)).
227. Id.
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subversive threat, disloyalty, and incongruent values—are remarkably
similar to the arguments that were utilized during World War II and the
Cold War. Today, like then, politicians seek to categorize MuslimAmericans as a mysterious “other” and as a threat to America’s security and
way of life.
There is no silver bullet for combating these stereotypes. As our
nation’s history has shown, minority integration often takes generations and
is often the result of years of both struggle and tragedy. Thus, while understanding there is no single program or law to hasten Muslim-American
integration, there are perhaps two general principles which political and
community leaders could follow:
A. Decouple Integration and Security
Even if one accepts that Muslim-Americans are not fundamentally
incompatible with the American system, America’s “War on Terror” and
the nation’s legitimate need for vigilant security policies remain. It is
undeniable that America’s enemies abroad continue to point to a radical
interpretation of Islam as justification for terrorism. It is therefore
unsurprising that at the governmental level, Muslim-American integration
and the fear of radicalization tends to be viewed solely as a security issue.
As this Note has attempted to explain, when faced with similar
circumstances and fears, the U.S. has, in the name of national security,
resorted to extreme initiatives that have isolated minority groups and
violated their constitutional rights. Today, the U.S. government and state
legislatures are beginning to embark down a similar path. Americans and
American policymakers do not, however, need to choose solely between
security and separation. In fact, given the threat of terrorism and radical
Islam, such a dichotomy would be detrimental to America’s security
objectives.
As Professor Samuel J. Rascoff has explained, if we accept the fact
that Muslim-American integration remains problematic and that subsequent
alienation (for fear of radicalization) should be avoided, the United States
must broaden its approach.228 Attempts to integrate Muslim-Americans
and prevent Muslim-American radicalization cannot be approached solely
as a “security” issue. In fact, doing so may only serve the opposing purpose.
228. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of
Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125 (2011) (arguing that American governmental
efforts to establish its version of an “Official Islam” is problematic and unlikely to succeed).
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The United States’ limited record in this regard is at best mixed and
European case studies—where Muslim immigration is far more prevalent—
have provided some important lessons.229 In Britain, “efforts at the management of Islam stem from the desire to engage in proactive counterterrorism, rather than as a corollary to the goal of cultural assimilation.”230
Thus, the British strategy for integrating Muslims into their society is also
focused almost purely on the need to combat terrorism. Its threefold
approach is to “respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism . . . ;
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism . . . ”; and “work with a
wide range of sectors and institutions . . . where there are risks of radicalization . . . .”231 While such a strategy seems reasonable, it has largely
backfired and has fueled the notion amongst many Muslims in Britain that
232
they are to be feared, not welcomed.
The United States federal government has pursued similar means and
focused almost solely on the “security” side of Muslim-American
integration. Specifically, the U.S. has fixated on the threat of “radicalization” and the fear that Muslim-American communities may embrace
violent interpretations of Islam. Among other approaches, the government
has adopted a strategy of engagement with Muslim communities to help
prevent the threat of a radicalized version of Sharia from taking hold.233
Simultaneously, the U.S. has sought to “bureaucratize” their MuslimAmerican outreach efforts: the U.S. has “invested heavily in intelligence
collection and analysis as part of a comprehensive approach to domestic
counter-radicalization;” the government has created new bureaucratic
posts—such as the Special Representative to Muslim Communities within
the State Department—to implement a counter-radicalization and inte229. Id. at 135 (“Legal concerns about counter-radicalization rooted in the law and
traditions associated with the Establishment Clause and in conceptions of religious liberty
more generally overlap with, and are reinforced by, a series of pragmatic and strategic
concerns about its efficacy.”).
230. Id. at 150.
231. Theresa May, Foreword to Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Prevent Strategy 1,
40 (June 2011) reprinted in Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and
Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 152 (2011).
232. See supra note 228, at 147 (“Ironically, American attempts at imitating British
counter-radicalization are beginning just as the British are modifying these programs in part
because of intense public criticism and political contestation.”).
233. Id. at 153 (“Domestic counter-radicalization efforts have increasingly been
predicated on the idea that engagement—outreach to certain Muslim communities in order to
make Official Islam a social reality—can play a crucial role in promoting domestic
security.”).
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gration strategy; and finally, the U.S. has embraced the British model of
“implicating government functions far afield of the national security
apparatus of the state.”234 For example, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools recently commissioned a
report entitled “Recruitment and Radicalization of School-Aged Youth by
International Terrorist Groups.”235 The study helps “the Department of
Education identify practical implications” of how recruitment and radicalization occur and determine “whether modifications to current policies and
practices being used by U.S. schools are indicated.”236
Certainly, such outreach efforts and security strategies may be
necessary. Nevertheless, these bureaucratized attempts to “counterradicalize” Muslims and prevent the entrenchment of a radical form of
Sharia are only a small piece of a larger puzzle. Integration of MuslimAmericans under the banner of security cannot be the sole strategy. Instead,
the U.S. must also view Muslim-American integration as an area of social
and civil rights policy. Today, Muslim-Americans are more vulnerable to
financial hardships than any other American religious group.237 Large
proportions of Muslims now claim there have been times in the past year
when they were unable to afford basic necessities such as food, shelter, and
healthcare.238 Likewise, Muslim-Americans are the only major U.S. religious group where less than half claim they would be able to make a
239
major purchase if they needed to.
Much of these financial hardships are likely linked to the anti-Muslim
phobia this Note has described. Nonetheless, if the federal government or a
state legislator is concerned about Muslim radicalization, these issues—not
the text of the Qu’ran—are what beg attention. Identifying Muslims as
members of society who are best integrated through counter-terror and
counter-radicalization policies only further stigmatizes and alienates them.
In essence, it teaches Muslims that their most valuable contribution to
society is to refrain from blowing up a building.
Surely, this is not the depth of acceptance that Muslim and nonMuslim Americans desire. Instead, integration initiatives—be it at the
234. Id. at 159.
235. HOMELAND SEC. INST., Recruitment and Radicalization of School-Aged Youth by
International Terrorist Groups (2009), reprinted in Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official
Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 159 (2011).
236. Id.
237. See MUSLIM AMERICANS: FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE infra note 246, at 16.
238. Id. at 17.
239. Id.
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national, state, local or non-governmental level—must focus on MuslimAmericans as just that: Muslim-Americans. Their religion need not be their
sole identifying trait and, like any American, policies must recognize their
desire for the same rights and social benefits that all Americans enjoy.
Rejecting and denouncing the anti-Sharia laws is one step. Additionally,
governmental and non-governmental institutions must address the issues
that Muslim-Americans care about and are affected by: unemployment,
education, healthcare, and racism. Focusing on these issues would not only
increase the assimilation and acceptance of an important minority group,
but it would also do far more than any surveillance or police strategy in
addressing the security fears that now dominate our view and treatment of
Muslim-Americans.
B. Do No Harm
While government and political institutions can play an important part
in encouraging minority assimilation, the most important players in any
society are of course not the leaders, but the people. From this idea comes a
second, yet fairly unremarkable principle: do no harm. Minority acceptance
in the United States has often been achieved through an organic process that
reflects the societal, cultural and political changes that slowly occur in the
background of our lives and experiences. A recent survey by the Pew
Research Center demonstrates this idea well. As has been noted, a
remarkable number of non-Muslim Americans have unfavorable views of
Islam. Nevertheless, Pew found that Americans who simply know a Muslim
are much more likely to have positive views of Islam and are less likely to
believe that Islam encourages violence.240 Reza Aslan, a renowned
Muslim-American political and academic commentator has noted a similar
historical trend. Aslan argues that while education and interfaith dialogues
will certainly help Christian and Jewish Americans understand Islam,
nothing can replace the benefits that result from life’s basic interactions.241
As Aslan likes to note, Jews were once also regarded as a suspicious and
242
Yet their acceptance into American society was
untrustworthy group.
240. See THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, MUSLIMS WIDELY
SEEN AS FACING DISCRIMINATION 2 (2009), available at http://www.people-press.org/files
/legacy-pdf/542.pdf.
241. See generally MUSLIMS AND JEWS IN AMERICA: COMMONALITIES, CONTENTIONS,
AND COMPLEXITIES (Reza Aslan & Aaron J. Hahn Tapper, eds.) (2011).
242. See id.
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not the result of Christian Americans reading the Torah and learning about
Judaism. On the contrary, it was through the simple exchanges and
connections within a community—going to school together, working together, joining the same clubs and organizations, playing sports together,
etc.—that fostered the acceptance and integration of Jews.243
Muslim-Americans can expect to find acceptance through a similar
path and, importantly, they will likely find acceptance quickly. MuslimAmericans are extremely “American.” Contrary to the aforementioned
stereotypes, Muslim-Americans are, in fact, more likely to identify with
their country than their religion,244 and Muslim-Americans are strong
believers in American democracy and the American judicial system.245
Muslim-Americans are not an inherently violent people. A recent Gallup
report found that Muslim-Americans are actually the least likely of any
religious group to believe that individual violence towards civilians is ever
246
Finally, Muslim-Americans are not seeking to force Islam or
justified.
Sharia on all Americans. On the contrary, Muslim-Americans have been
shown to be extremely open-minded and exceptionally tolerant of other
religious groups.247 Perhaps unexpectedly, such tolerance may indeed be
due to the fact that Muslim-Americans are the most racially-diverse
religious group in the United States.248 They are themselves composed of a

243.
244.

See id.
ABU DHABI GALLUP CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS: FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE
FUTURE 50 (2011) (“In no major U.S. religious group is there a conflict between loyalty to
the U.S. and identifying with others around the world who share the same religion. Rather,
in every group, including Muslim Americans, people who identify extremely strongly with
the U.S. are also more likely to identify strongly with their worldwide religious identity.”).
245. Id. at 23 (“Muslim Americans are the most likely of any religious group in the
U.S. to say the country’s elections are honest. Fifty-seven percent of Muslim Americans say
this, versus 44% of Protestant Americans . . . . Moreover, Muslim Americans are just as
likely as other religious groups to say they have confidence in the U.S. media and judicial
system.”).
246. Id. at 31 (“Muslim Americans are the least likely of all major religions in the U.S.
to justify individuals or small groups attacking civilians.”).
247. Id. at 41 (“Despite believing that they are often the victims of prejudice, Muslim
Americans are among the most tolerant of all major faiths in the U.S. Their attitudes toward
other religious groups qualify 44% of them as being ‘integrated,’ the highest possible level
on a continuum of acceptance of other faiths.”).
248. See THE MUSLIM WEST FACT PROJECT, MUSLIM AMERICANS: A NATIONAL
PORTRAIT 10 (2009) (“Muslim Americans are the most racially diverse religious group
surveyed in the United States. African Americans represent the largest racial group (35%)
within the national U.S. Muslim population, more than a quarter of Muslim Americans
classify themselves as ‘white,’ and about one in five identify themselves as ‘Asian.’”).
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variety of racial and ethnic groups and their lineage can be traced to
colonial America, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, etc.249
Fears that Islam is incompatible with Western society are also
misplaced. There are undoubtedly statements from the Qu’ran and sunna
that run counter to American constitutional principles. However, this fact
alone does not render Islam a violent and inimical religion. More precisely,
because Islam—like the other Abrahamic faiths—is based upon a text that
is centuries old, applying that text in any modern society can be difficult
and is subject to bizarre and radical interpretations. Christianity and
Judaism also have their own principles that if taken literally or out of
context would clearly be hostile to Western ideas of democracy, freedom
and equality.250
The goal of this Note is not to prescribe a proper role for Sharia or
foreign law in the American legal framework. Neither though is that the
goal of the anti-Sharia legislators who are proposing the Sharia and foreign
law bans across the country. In fact, this movement and these proposals are
simply reactions to misconceived fears and these pieces of legislation are
unnecessary, misguided, and will do vastly more harm than good. From a
legal standpoint, the Supreme Court has already addressed what role, if any,
foreign and international law should have in U.S. courts. This debate is
actually much less threatening and while there may be times where a judge
is forced to acknowledge a couple’s or individual’s Islamic beliefs when
interpreting certain civil matters, our laws, the Constitution, and our
nation’s jurisprudence provides all the guidance our courts should
require.251
From a societal standpoint, the anti-Sharia laws are much more
problematic. Instead of encouraging Muslim-Americans to become active
members of their community, these laws reinforce the notion that Muslim249.
250.

Id.
See WAJAHAT ALI AND MATTHEW DUSS, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
UNDERSTANDING SHARIA 1, 3 (2011) (“The equivalent would be saying that Jews stone
disobedient sons to death (Deut. 21:18-21) or that Christians slay all non-Christians (Luke
19:27).”).
251. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Louis Henkin,
International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984); Arthur
Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1
(1995); Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Harold
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and
Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997).
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Americans are to be isolated. Instead of emphasizing the fact that MuslimAmericans seek the same goals and aspirations as all Americans, these laws
emphasize that Muslim-Americans are to be feared. These laws run afoul of
today’s cultural and social currents and they are completely detached from
what is actually occurring on the ground. In every corner of American
society, Muslim-Americans have demonstrated just how “American” they
are. Within our communities, businesses, academic institutions and political
processes, Muslims and non-Muslims are engaging with one another and
learning from one another. Going forward, this process must be encouraged, not stifled, and any attempts to isolate and segregate MuslimAmericans must be denounced, not promoted.
IX. Conclusion
Professor Geoffrey Stone recently noted: “[a] time-honored method of
gaining or consolidating power is to incite public fear, demonize an internal
‘enemy,’ and then ‘protect’ the public by prosecuting, interning, deporting,
and spying upon those accused of disloyalty.”252 Sadly, we are seeing a
similar pattern unfold today. The uproar over Sharia and MuslimAmericans, however, is completely misplaced. We should not simply focus
on what is written in the Qu’ran or the sunna and presume that this
precisely defines Muslim-Americans. On the contrary, we should focus on
the people these texts are meant to guide. It is easy to look at a document
that is centuries old and discover ideas or statements that do not translate to
today. Likewise, it is easy to look at individuals or leaders in distant
countries and determine that because they share a religion in name, they
share the same goals and values. One only has to look and interact with
Muslim-Americans today to realize that such lazy characterizations are
incorrect.
Still, anti-Muslim views have grown more common. Recently, on the
floor of the Tennessee State Assembly, State Senator Rick Womick went
before his colleagues to warn them of the threat of Islam and Sharia. He
declared that he had been studying the Qu'ran and determined that Sharia is
a political, legal, and military doctrine that calls for global jihad and world
domination. “Folks,” Sen. Womick, said, “this is not what I call ‘Do unto
others what you’d have them do unto you.’”253
252. Stone, supra note 190, at 2208–09.
253. Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Sharia Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2001, at A1.

226

19 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 183 (2012)

Similar warnings are being echoed across the country as elected
officials and activists mobilize against what they describe as the menace of
Sharia in the United States. History has taught us that in the midst of
national crises and threats to our security, such rhetoric can be dangerous.
Over the next several years, as additional proposals to ban Sharia and
alienate Muslim-Americans are put forward, it will be essential for the
government and the public to chart a different course.

